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The second MOCHO meeting, Amsterdam,  
24th of May, 2002  
 
The second MOCHO meeting in Amsterdam was a huge success. After a heavy morning session 
where all practical arrangements as to our future work were made, we spent the afternoon listening 
to the different teams’ presentations on a variety of topics of the utmost interest to our MOCHO 
project. Below, we have assembled the summaries of some of the presentations. Firstly, there is the 
presentation of Hélène Périvier from our French team on the extent to which family policies 
accommodate female employment in France. Secondly, there is Síle O’Dorchai from the Belgian 
team’s presentation on the three clusters of welfare state comparisons in which she first brought 
together some very interesting existing typologies together and then tried to identify how they are 
distinguished from one another. Thirdly, Daniela Del Boca of the University of Turin and CHILD 
analysed the effect of child care system characteristics on women's labour supply decisions in the 
particular situation of Italy. Fourthly, the presentation of Marilena Locatelli and Ugo Colombino is a 
model that allows the evaluation of household' welfare that follows the introduction of a fiscal 
decentralisation system, or subsides given to the families, or a change in public services supplied by 
municipalities. A fifth contribution was made by Daniela Vuri. She analysed the "breakdown of the 
traditional family" that has attracted much concern particularly because of its perceived negative 
implication for children. Following Daniela Vuri’s article, you will find a summary of Spyridon 
Tryfonas’ presentation on behalf of the Greek team. He enlightened the question of how motherhood 
affects time allocation. Finally, Cécile Wetzels from the Dutch team shared some of the results of a 
very recent study of hers on the topic of Dutch women’s efforts on the labour market. She tried to 
answer the following question: Is there a double selection into motherhood and type of jobs? 
 
 
Family Policies and Female Employment in France : between 




French mothers achievements...  
The trend of female employment in France is original in comparison with the other European 
countries. Although French women have more children than their European sister members they are 
massively present on the labour market. As Jeanne Fagnani (2001) emphasises it, this paradox 
changes the general idea about the negative impact of female activity on fertility. 
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How to explain this phenomenon? 
The generous family policies that have 
been implemented in France for 30 
years are probably one of the main 
explanations of this evolution. Since 
1968 French women have had a stronger 
bargaining power to make public 
policies become more friendly to the 
“mother at work pattern”. The causal 
relation is not that clear though: is it 
because French women used to fight 
more that they have obtained these 
favourable family policies or is it thanks 
to these policies that they have managed 
to reach their present position on the 
labour market? It is difficult to answer 
to this question. Nevertheless the wide 
public policy for families has obviously 
had a strong effect on female 
employment growth in France. 
 
Can we consider France as the 
“working women’s heaven”? 
Not really, some disparities and 
inequities are hidden behind this 
positive general situation. The strongest 
result is that it easier to reconcile 
professional and family life for those 
women who are more skilled and have a 
more secure position on the labour 
market. Just as a remark it is striking to 
see that this theme of the reconciliation 
between work and family is still and 
again posed in terms of a purely 
feminine choice without taking into 
account that men are a part of the family 
too! But let’s focus on the 
characteristics and problems of the 
French family policies and theirs effects 
on female labour behaviour. 
The main aim of French family policy is 
no longer fertility but it is to cover the 
cost of children in order to guarantee the 
standard of living of families that have 
children relative to those without 
children. The “Allocations familiales” 
(Family Allowances) firstly 
implemented to stimulate fertility, are 
now more focused on a horizontal 
equity objective (even if they are still 
not available for the first child, who is 
thus costly for parents anyway). They 
are given to all parents with more than 2 
children whatever their level of income. 
One of the most important costs induced 
by children is childcare. Childcare 
support can take two different forms. 
The first one is to offer some solutions 
either in covering the cost of childcare 
or in proposing public facilities 
(Crèches, day nurseries...). The second 
one is to use the employment policy in 
order to fit the time of work with the 
family constraints. The mix of 
employment objectives and family 
support can have perverse effects on 
mothers’ employment as we will see 
later. 
 
Is the French system generous for 
every family? 
The French system is fairly generous. 
Globally family policy represents 3% of 
GDP. It is just behind the Nordic 
countries. The development of childcare 
supports has been concentrated on 
individual childcare systems at the 
expense of collectives facilities. The 
growth rate of the number of places in 
crèches has kept slowing down during 
the 80’s. It has fallen from above 72% at 
the end of the 70’s to 5 % in 1990. 
Crèches and day nurseries were accused 
to be a too rigid solution that could not 
appropriately meet parents’ demand. 
The French government has reduced 
public investments for childcare and 
promoted individual childcare supports. 
This trend has created two kinds of 
inequalities. The first one is a 
geographical inequality related to the 
access to childcare facilities : as public 
investments are mainly decided at the 
local level, only the big towns can 
afford these expenses. There is then a 
gap between equipment in the urban 
areas and in the country. Individual 
supports, that have been strongly 
developed, are mainly offered through 
tax advantages and cash transfers for 
people who employ a childminder at 
home or outside. So only families who 
are rich enough to afford these kinds of 
childcare means and whose income is 
high enough to be taxable are 
concerned. Then it creates a social 
inequality because the poorest families 
do not have access to these kinds of 
supports. 
 
Between good intention and way out.... 
The government can also mix the aims 
of employment policy and family 
policy. This double objective might 
have perverse effects. During periods 
with a high level of unemployment, like 
the 80’s and the beginning of the 90’s, 
the temptation is considerable for 
governments to use a family objective in 
order to lure women into home and then 
reduce the unemployment rate. The 
Allocation Parentale d’Education 
(Education Allowance for Parents) 
illustrates this point of view. It has been 
created in the mid 80’s to help parents 
with three children to mind: the parent 
who stopped working in order to mind 
for the third child was given a monthly 
allowance until the youngest child 
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reached three years of age. Most of the 
time the mother was the parent who 
interrupted or definitely stopped her 
career after the birth of the third child. 
Even without any allowances the third 
child used to induce the withdrawal of 
mothers from the labour market. The 
first version of this measure did not 
have a strong effect in terms of 
modification of female labour 
behaviour. 
But in 1994, the French government 
extended this policy in two manners. 
The first one is the possibility to take up 
the allowance at a partial rate and then 
keep working at part time. This point of 
the reform has actually made parents’ 
life easier. 20% of the beneficiaries of 
the APE are at partial rate. The second 
extension was to offer the APE from the 
second child onwards. The incentive 
effect for mothers to interrupt their 
career was then massive and it has had a 
stronger effect than expected. About 
110 000 mothers have withdrawn from 
the labour market in order to take care 
of their second child at full time. We 
notice that less than 2% of the 
beneficiaries are men. At first glance 
this measure appears to be an efficient 
way to help parents with two children. 
Even if we do not talk about the 
negative impact for women’s career to 
stop working during three years (in 
terms of promotion and so on) it has 
been dramatic for women who did not 
have a secure enough job they could go 
back to for sure after the APE period. 
 
So what has happened for unskilled 
mothers? 
All women who were at the fringe of the 
labour market before taking up the 
allowance, whose job was a precarious 
one, were then stuck in a inactivity trap 
without possibility to get back by 
themselves onto the labour market. In 
this view the full rate APE can be 
considered as a kind of mother’s wage 
but only a temporary one! The APE has 
had a positive effect for most women, 
who have taken it up at partial rate or 
who have chosen the full rate but have a 
secure job. Usually these women are 
skilled. But it has had a strong perverse 
effect in evicting from the labour market 
women who were generally unskilled. 
After the three years of right to the APE, 
these women are generally not able to 
find a job because of their lack of 
training and their too long inactivity 
period. In conclusion, it has encouraged 
unskilled women to go back home. It 
has strengthened the disparity and the 
inequality that were already strong 
between skilled and unskilled women. 
 
How to improve the situation? 
There are two main possibilities for the 
French government to fight this 
precariousness of unskilled women: 
either going the whole way in offering a 
genuine mother’s wage that will insure a 
kind of financial security and 
independence. But this solution means a 
strong flashback for women’s rights and 
their social independence. A second 
solution is more compatible with this 
objective and consists in offering 
training during the receiving period or 
to encourage the partial rate take up of 
the allowance. 
In conclusion, French family policies in 
general are generous and diversified. 
They have assisted female employment 
development thanks to different 
measures that have made it easier for 
women to take care of their children and 
to work at the same time. But as we 
have shown there is still a lot to do : 
in terms of public investment to 
increase massively the numbers of 
places in crèches and day nurseries; 
in terms of fittings of specific 
measures in order to suppress the 
inactivity trap of unskilled women; 
in terms of encouragement and 
incentives for fathers to be more 
involved in family life and try to 
generalise this question to both 









In recent years, a great number of 
researchers have established different 
typologies of welfare states. Many have 
evaluated welfare states using different 
criteria, starting out from different 
angles and weighing differently separate 
features of welfare states. This article 
sheds light on the different existing 
typologies of welfare states and how 
they differ in methodology and results. 
The main finding is that typologies 
differ only slightly no matter which 
methodology the researcher used or 
which features his attention was 
concentrated upon.  
 
The first cluster of welfare state 
typologies 
 
